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FEDERAL PREEMPTION IN
METRO TAXICAB BOARD OF TRADE V. CITY OF NEW YORK:
A RED LIGHT FOR LOCAL GREEN LAWS?
DEREK LESLIE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a press release dated November 14, 2008, Mayor Michael
Bloomberg announced new incentives for fuel efficient taxicabs in New
York City (hereinafter "the City").' The Mayor sought these incentives
with the goals of greening yellow cabs, improving air quality, and reducing
carbon emissions in the City.2 In response, the City's taxicab fleet owners,
alongside the Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, brought an action
against the City, the Mayor, and other officials, seeking a preliminary
injunction against the new rules. In Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of
New Yorlc3 (hereinafter "Metro Taxicab"), the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York enjoined the City from enforcing the
regulation. The court found that the regulation effectively mandated the
use of hybrid cabs and was, therefore, preempted by federal legislation.'
This Comment examines federal preemption in the context of fuel
efficiency and emissions standards as discussed in Metro Taxicab. Section
II outlines the factual and procedural background that is necessary for a
complete understanding of the case. Section III scrutinizes the City's
regulations and the standards pertinent to federal preemption. Section IV
outlines the implications of Metro Taxicab, with a particular focus on the
direction of future litigation when state and local governments attempt to
incentivize low emission of hybrid vehicles.
II. RELEVANT HISTORY AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Metro Taxicab arose out of an ongoing dispute between the City's
Mayor, Michael Bloomberg, and the City's taxicab companies.6 Prior to
* Staff Member, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, & NATURAL RESOURCES
LAw, 2009-2010. B.A. Political Science & B.A. English Literature/Folklore 2008, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, J.D. expected May 2011, University of Kentucky College of Law.
' Press Release, Office of the Mayor, Mayor Bloomberg Announces New
Incentive/Disincentive Program to Reach Goal of Green Taxi Fleet (Nov. 14, 2008), available at
http://nyc.gov (search date under "News and Press Releases").2
1d.
Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 633 F. Supp. 2d 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).4 1d. at 87.
5id.
6Id. at85.
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the promulgation of the disputed regulations in Metro Taxicab, the City's
Taxicab & Limousine Commission (hereinafter, "TLC") had attempted to
require the City's taxicabs to "meet a specific miles-per-gallon (hereinafter,
"mpg") rating.",7 Specifically, the TLC rule would have required that all
new taxicabs in the City have a minimum fuel efficiency of 25 mpg with an
increase to 30 mpg by October 1, 2009.8 In September 2008, a group of
plaintiffs, similar to those in Metro Taxicab, moved to enjoin the proposed
TLC rule.9 In that case (hereinafter, "25/30 Rule Case"), the court enjoined
the TLC rule and found it to be a clear mandate that owners purchase
hybrid or clean diesel taxicabs.'0 The court found this mandate to be
preempted by the Federal Energy Policy and Conservation Act (hereinafter,
"EPCA"), because Congress enacted legislation adopting federal fuel
efficiency standards which left no room for local mpg standards." As a
result, the district court granted a preliminary injunction.
12
The City's second attempt at pursuing the goals of "'greening the
taxi fleet"' and making New York a "'cleaner, healthier city""' 3 resulted in
Metro Taxicab. In March 2009, the TLC repealed its prior rule and enacted
TLC Rule 1-78(a)(3). 14 This regulation, which meant to incentivize the
purchase of hybrid taxicabs and diminish the use of conventional non-
hybrid taxicabs, provided the hourly rates at which an owner may lease a
vehicle to a driver.15 The regulation increased the rate for a hybrid taxicab
by $3 per 12-hour shift and reduced the rate for a non-hybrid taxicab by
increasing amounts in subsequent years.' 6 These rates were "reduced by $4
immediately, $8 in May 2010, and $12 in May 201 1.'17 The Plaintiffs
challenged this revised regulation and sought a preliminary injunction.
18
The Plaintiffs in Metro Taxicab are city taxicab fleet owners and
the Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, a trade association of such fleet
owners. Fleet owners operate by leasing their vehicles to drivers who pay
hourly rates to the fleet owners for operating the taxicabs.' 9 The Plaintiffs
control more than 25% of the taxicabs in the City.20 The Defendants in
7 Id
I d. at 88. The court referred to this standard as the "25/30 Rule." Id.
9 Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 88.
10 
Id.
" Id. at 85, 87.
'21d. at88.
13 Id. at 85 (quoting Mayor Michael Bloomberg).
'4 1d. at 88.
'" Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 85. These rules will be further referred to as "lease cap
rules."
'6 1d.
17 id.
is Id. at 86-87.
'
9 1d at 91.
20 id.
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Metro Taxicab are the City of New York, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and
several TLC officials in their official capacities.2'
HI. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS IN METRO TAXI
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction faces a heavy burden
because enjoining a city regulation prior to a full consideration by the court
carries with it significant due process concerns.22 In these cases, the
plaintiffs must (1) show that the behavior they seek to enjoin will cause
them irreparable injury, and (2) establish a likelihood of success on the
merits. 23 This standard framed the court's analysis in Metro Taxicab.
In determining whether irreparable harm had occurred, the court in
Metro Taxicab relied on the 25/30 Rule Case,24 where the court found that
no private cause of action existed under the EPCA.25 According to Metro
Taxicab, this lack of private cause of action was a sufficient showing of
irreparable damages to the Plaintiffs.26
Next, the court analyzed the Plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the
merits. The court in Metro Taxicab recognized the "hot button" nature of
the issues and stressed the narrow confines upon which the decision
turned.2 7 Neither party disputed the desirable motives behind the new
regulations. A cleaner, more environmentally friendly city, the parties
agreed, was certainly a legitimate governmental interest and inured to
everyone's benefit.28 The Plaintiffs instead focused their argument on the
significant economic burden of the de facto mandate presented by the new
regulations. 29 The City conceded that it could not plainly require that new
motor vehicles in the city meet mileage or emissions standards beyond
those required by federal law.30
A local law can be preempted if it indirectly regulates within an
area preempted by an act of Congress such that it "effectively mandates a
specific, preempted outcome.",3' Thus, the case turned on the narrower issue
of whether the City's lease cap rules interfered with "[c]ongressional intent
to preserve exclusive jurisdiction" for the federal government in this area.32
To resolve this issue, the court used a two-part analysis. First, the court
21 Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 91.
22 See id. at 92.
23 Id.
24 id.
2' See id at 88.
26 id.
27 Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 87.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 95.
32 Id. at 87.
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asked whether the regulations constituted a mandate. 3 The second inquiry,
assuming the new rules did constitute such a mandate, was whether the new
rules were "related to" mileage or emission standards as to be preempted by
federal regulations.34
A. The Rules Represent a de Facto Mandate
Before addressing the issues of preemption, the court turned to the
Plaintiff's argument that the lease cap rules limited a party's freedom of
choice to the point that it became a de facto mandate.35 In essence, it must
be determined if the regulation operates in such a way as to provide actors
with only one "real" choice.36 For guidance, the court looked at cases
involving state laws that facially presented choices, but which in effect
mandated outcomes in the areas regulated by the Employee Retirement
Income Securities Act of 1974 (hereinafter "ERISA").37
The court found New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co. particularly useful. In that case, the court
recognized "'that a state law might produce such acute, albeit indirect,
economic effects, by intent or otherwise, as to force an ERISA plan to
adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage or effectively restrict its
choice of insurers, and that such a state law might indeed be pre-
empted." '' 38  From this analysis the Metro Taxicab court concluded that
state-promulgated incentives and disincentives could be so extreme as to
constitute economic coercion, which would force parties into a behavioral
scheme preempted by federal law.39 While the precise level of incentives
that constitute a mandate is uncertain, a plaintiff must prove by a "clear
showing" that the rules effectively create such a mandate.40
The Plaintiffs in Metro Taxicab met this burden through expert
testimony at an evidentiary hearing. The Plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr.
Levinsohn, testified regarding the economic effect of the regulations on
fleet owners .4  He concluded that under the lease cap rules, owners who
operated hybrid taxicabs saw a substantial increase in profitability, while
those operating non-hybrid taxicabs saw profit margins diminish
42significantly as the lease rates for these vehicles decreased over time. Dr.
33 Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 87.
3 Id.
35 Id. at 93.
36 Id.
37 id.
31 Id. (quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995)).39 Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 93.
40 Id. at 96.
"4I d. at 92.
4
2
See id at 96-97.
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Levinsohn estimated that in 2011, when the lease cap rules would operate
to their full effect, the relative advantage of using a hybrid taxicab as
opposed to a conventional taxicab would reach approximately $6,500 per
year.43 In later years, Dr. Levinsohn suggested that owners of conventional
taxicabs could even be operating at a loss.44 Given the size of the profit
disparity between the two choices, Dr. Levinsohn concluded that no rational
taxicab owner would choose to operate conventional, less fuel efficient,
taxicabs. 45 The court found this testimony very persuasive in showing that
the lease cap rules' economic effect was a de facto mandate toward more
fuel efficient vehicles.46
The City was unable to effectively rebut Dr. Levinsohn's
testimony. While the City's witnesses questioned his methodology, they
did not present competing conclusions.47 Primarily, the City argued that a
mandate did not exist because owners were free to continue purchasing
non-hybrid vehicles as long as they could still earn $1 in profits while doing
so, even though higher profits were available by opting for hybrid
vehicles. 48  As long as some profit margin existed under both options,
actors could choose, and thus, no mandate existed.
The court rejected this argument due to its narrow view of the type
of economic coercion that would constitute a mandate.49 Even one of the
City's expert witnesses, upon cross-examination, conceded that when given
the choice of renting a room to one tenant for $100 or to another for $200, a
rational landlord would prefer to rent to the tenant paying the higher rent.5°
The court recognized this economic effect as a matter of common sense,
suggesting:
[e]ven a first-grader who has nothing recognizes that
getting $100 is much better than getting $1, even though
the first-grader is better off with $1 than with $0. Given a
choice, the first-grader will always take $100, just as the
Fleet Owners will always take a profit of $7,100 (hybrids)
over a profit of $580 (Crown Victorias), the expected
differential in May 2011 under Dr. Levinsohn's analysis.5'
43 1d. at97.
44id
4s Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 97.
46 See id at 99-100.47 1d. at 99.
48 See id at 97.
49 1d. at99.
'0 Id. at 98.
"' Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 100.
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Consequently, the court determined that the lease cap rules presented
taxicab fleet owners with the option of either purchasing conventional
taxicabs with significantly decreasing marginal profits, or purchasing
hybrid taxicabs with higher profit margins. The court concluded that since
there was only one sound economic choice, the lease cap rules constituted a
mandate for the purchase of hybrid taxicabs in the City.
B. The Lease Cap Rules are Preempted Because they Operate within the
Scope of Federal Law
Next, to address the issue of preemption, the court asked whether a
regulatory mandate for more efficient taxicabs was sufficiently related to
federal mileage or emission standards. Federal fuel economy and
efficiency standards had been addressed by Congress in the form of the
EPCA and the Clean Air Act (hereinafter, "CAA"). Thus, the preemption
inquiry turned on the congressional intent to cover the field in enacting
these standards, leaving no room for state or municipal legislation within
the regulatory sphere of these statutes.53
i. Federal Fuel Efficiency Standards in the EPCA Preempted New
York City's Lease Cap Rules
To determine whether the lease cap rules were preempted by
federal fuel efficiency standards, the court looked to the procedure
established by the EPCA and its express preemption provision.54 Through
textual interpretation, the court determined that Congress clearly intended
"to make ... fuel efficiency standards exclusively a federal concern." 55 In
reaching this conclusion, the court noted the EPCA's finely-tuned federal
procedures for establishing nationwide fuel efficiency standards and the
16EPCA's express preemption provision.
In the EPCA, Congress delineated a precise procedure for
determining fuel efficiency standards.57 This procedure, the court noted,
was delicately crafted to ensure that consideration was given equally to the
competing concerns at issue when developing fuel efficiency standards.58
Precisely, the EPCA delegated the task of establishing federal fuel economy
standards to the Department of Transportation (hereinafter "DOT").59 In
52 id.
S/d. at 87.
RId. at 101.
55 id.
56 See id.
17 See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 101.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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carrying out this task, the DOT, through the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (hereinafter "NHTSA"), would weigh four factors:
"'[(1)] technological feasibility, [(2)] economic practicability, [(3)] the
effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy,
and [(4)] the need of the United States to conserve energy.' "6
The NHTSA's interpretation of economic practicability is
particularly important. The NHTSA chose to interpret this factor broadly in
order to maintain choice and prevent undue hardship. 6' By taking this
approach, the NHTSA critically viewed any economic burden that a fuel
efficiency standard would impose and tried to avoid an overly stringent
standard. The current standards require that a manufacturer's line of new
passenger vehicles must average at least 27.5 mpg.62 This figure would rise
to 35 mpg by 2020.63 Therefore, the court concluded that the federal
government, through the EPCA, intended to establish its own regulatory
regime that provided uniform national fuel efficiency standards.
64
Moreover, the EPCA had an express preemption provision:
[w]hen an average fuel economy standard prescribed under
this chapter ... is in effect, a State or political subdivision
of a State may not adopt or enforce a law or regulation
related to fuel economy standards or average fuel economy
standards for automobiles covered by an average fuel
65economy standard under this chapter.
The City argued that even if the lease cap rules constituted a
mandate, they were not preempted by the EPCA because they were not
sufficiently related to fuel efficiency standards.66 The City believed that a
mandate for hybrid taxicabs was not sufficiently related to fuel efficiency
standards because vehicles were not required to meet a specific mpg rating.
The court recognized that while the regulation did not require a specific
mpg rating, it effectively required taxicab owners to purchase taxicabs that
operate over a specific mpg threshold.67 Moreover, the court expressed
60 Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. §32902(0 (2006)).
61 Id. (citing Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d
295, 307 (D.Vt. 2007)).
62 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 32902(b) (2006)).
63 Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 101 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 32902(b) (2006)). These
requirements have since become more stringent. In April 2010, the EPA and NHTSA announced new
standards that required all passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles to
meet an average 35.5 mpg standard by the year 2016. The change has no substantive effect on the
analysis of the court. EPA Regulations and Standards, http://www.epa.gov/otaq/Climate/regulations.htm
(last visited April 15, 2010).
64 Id.
65 Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2006)) (emphasis added).
66Id. at 102.6 7 Id. at 101.
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concern that construing "related to" narrowly would promote state and
municipal intrusions into Congress's established standards, causing an
aggregate effect that would "'undo Congress's carefully calibrated
regulatory scheme."'' 68 As a result, the lease cap rules in effect imposed
fuel efficiency standards that were preempted by the EPCA.69
Additionally, the court observed that the City's purpose in enacting
the lease cap rules was to impose fuel efficiency standards that were
preempted under the EPCA.70 Referencing the 25/30 Rule Case, the Metro
Taxicab court noted that through the lease cap rules the City tried to
effectuate the same outcome that the earlier court had deemed to be
explicitly preempted.7' While the lease cap rules may be deemed creative
drafting by the City, such creative drafting did not avoid the conclusion that
the new rules had the same purpose as prior rules: therefore, both in
purpose and effect, the lease cap rules were meant to impose mpg fuel
efficiency standards.72
ii. Federal Emissions Standards in the CAA Preempted New York
City's Lease Cap Rules
The CAA operates similarly to the EPCA. It delegates a task of
creating regulations to prevent the further deterioration of air quality to the
Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter "EPA"). 73 Like the EPCA,
the CAA contains an express preemption provision. The court relied on the
congressional purpose and the language of the express preemption
provision in order to find that the City's lease cap rules were also
preempted by federal emission standards.
The CAA's express preemption provision provided that no political
subdivision may promulgate "any standard relating to the control of
emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines. 74 To
analyze this provision, the court relied upon American Automobile
Manufacturers Ass 'n v. Cahil17 5. In Cahill, the court found a New York
law that required a certain percentage of cars sold within the state to be
zero-emissions vehicles was preempted by the CAA and federal emissions
standards.76 In Cahill, the challenged statute did not provide precise limits
68 Id. at 103 (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246,
255 (2004)).
69 Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 103.
'0 Id. at 102-103.
" Id. at 103.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74Id. at 103-104 (quoting 42 U.S.C.§ 7543(a) (2006)).
75 Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 1998).
76 Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp 2d at 104 (citing Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d
196, 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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on emissions, but its purpose and effect was to control and limit
emissions. 7 Using similar reasoning, the court in Metro Taxicab found the
lease cap rules also had the purpose and effect of regulating emissions. "It
[was] a matter of common sense that a rule with the stated purpose of
increasing the number of 'cleaner vehicles' and with the effect of requiring
the purchase of hybrid taxicabs [was] a rule 'relating to the control of
emissions.'" 7 8 Consequently, the court determined that the lease cap rules
represented a de facto mandate for the purchase of hybrid taxicabs, and that
the purpose and effect of such a mandate was to reduce emission levels.79
The CAA expressly preempted such local regulations.
The court concluded that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed in
showing that the lease cap rules operated as a de facto mandate of fuel
economy and emission standards preempted by Congressional action. 0
The rules operated as a de facto mandate because they contained strong
economic incentives meant to induce the purchase of hybrid taxicabs. This
mandate, in purpose and effect, created fuel efficiency and emission
standards that frustrated the elaborate regulatory scheme established by
Congress. For these reasons, the court found the City's lease cap rules were
preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and
ordered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of these rules.8 '
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF METRO TAXICAB
Is there any room left for drafting local green laws and regulations?
In Metro Taxicab, the court lauded the City's admirable environmental
goals, yet still enjoined the City from enforcing the lease cap rules. The
Plaintiffs, taxicab owners who will continue to purchase, lease, and operate
conventional vehicles, succeeded. The Mayor's Office fumed in reaction to
the defeat of its first proposed set of regulations, claiming that the court
82upheld an archaic law.8 Despite this outcome, federal preemption is
unlikely to close the door on local green laws and regulations. The court in
Metro Taxicab recognized the historic police powers retained by state and
local governments and indicated that acts of Congress, operating within
areas historically covered by the scope of these police powers, should be
construed narrowly. Further, even if the federal law in question is meant to
be comprehensive, the state and municipal governments may certainly
provide incentives and disincentives as part of their police power.
77 Id. (citing Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196, 200 (2d Cir. 1998)).
78 Id. at 105 (citing 42 U.S.C.§ 7543(a) (2006)).
79Id. at 105-106.
s Id.
81 Id
82 Press Release, supra note 1.
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In Metro Taxicab, the court's two-part analysis of the CAA and the
EPCA Acts is significant. While federal preemption will often be construed
broadly in order to avoid frustrating the congressional regulatory scheme,
the courts may be inclined to construe a de facto mandate narrowly. If a
municipality can show that a statute or regulation merely offers incentives
to promote admirable environmental goals without mandating only one
choice, then the courts will not be as constrained by federal preemption in
allowing the municipality to pursue such goals. By avoiding the federal
preemption question, municipalities will find the courts more deferential to
the exercise of their police powers.
Finally, while the court in Metro Taxicab concluded that the
economic disparity between purchasing conventional and hybrid vehicles
was so great as to constitute a de facto mandate, this issue of mandate will
always be a fact-sensitive inquiry. Particularly relevant to this inquiry will
be the degree to which a new standard departs from previous incentives and
standards, or conflicts with prevailing local business norms. Many courts
may be hesitant to suggest that anything short of the extreme profit
disparities present in Metro Taxicab constitute a de facto mandate.
Nevertheless, Metro Taxicab stands as a stark example of why incentives
may only go so far, and arguments that a particular regulation does not
compel an outcome will be insufficient to defeat claims of preemption.
V. CONCLUSION
In Metro Taxicab, the court found that regulations by the City
meant to incentivize the purchase of hybrid taxicabs, were preempted by
federal law because they constituted a de facto mandate in areas where
Congress had devised an intricate regulatory scheme supported by express
rules preempting state and local action. The court's opinion is likely to be
influential because concerns about the harm caused by greenhouse gas
emissions and the exhaustion of finite natural resources increasingly draw
citizens to the polls. While the court's analysis suggests that state and
municipal regulations on these issues are susceptible to preemption by
federal standards, it seems likely that litigation will often turn on fact-
sensitive inquiries as to what constitutes a de facto mandate.
[Vol. 2 No. 2
